Despite the rapid progress of the information technology, protecting computers and networks remain a major problem for most authors. In this paper, two grains levels intrusion detection system (IDS) is suggested (fine-grained and coarse-grained). In normal case, where intrusions are not detected, the most suitable IDS level is the coarse-grained to increase IDS performance. As soon as any intrusion is detected by coarse-grained IDS, the fine-grained is activated to detect the possible attack details. Very fast decision tree algorithm is used in both of these detection levels. In order to ensure efficiency of the proposed model, it has been tested on KDD CUP 99 offline dataset and a real traffic dataset. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed model is highly successful in detecting known and unknown attacks, and can be successfully adapted with packets' flow to increase IDS performance. This article explains how we got a detection rate greater than 93% with an average processing time equals to 3 Â 10 À6 s per example.
Introduction
The frequency of computer intrusions has increased rapidly during the last two decades. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are an essential component of a complete defense-in-depth architecture for network security. They collect and inspect packets, looking for evidence of intrusive behaviors. As soon as an intrusive event is detected, an alarm is raised giving the security analyst an opportunity to react promptly.
Unfortunately, most of designed IDSs cannot cope with fast networks.
Although several IDS systems are available, the common objectives of these systems are to reduce the amount of false alarms [1] , and to recognize new attacks in order to increase detection ratio. In this paper, the concentration is on detecting known and unknown attacks in fast networks in order to mitigate the influence of the attack by shrinking the time gap between the real attack and its detection. This paper contribution is to build two grains levels IDS in order to detect abnormal behavior of network traffic and cope with fast networks. It is well known that the intrusion occurrence in networks with respect to normal traffic is rare. These motivate us to build the proposed two grains levels IDS. These detection levels are fine-grained and coarse-grained. In normal case, where intrusions are not detected, the most suitable IDS level is the coarse-grained to increase monitoring performance. At the moment of intrusion is detected by coarse-grained IDS, the fine-grained IDS is activated to detect as most as possible of attack details. Fig. 1 shows the main idea. The coarse-grained IDS focuses on five packet features while fine-grained IDS works on 20 features. Very Fast Decision Tree (VFDT) [2] algorithm is selected as a fast classifier. The advantages of the proposed system are processing and analyzing of high-speed network traffic, discovering and accurately identifying new attacks to reduce the false alarms to the maximum extent, and detecting the intrusion in real time.
DARPA KDD CUP 99 dataset is used as a benchmark for the proposed IDS, which contains 41 features. As a preprocessing step, we analyzed these features and have selected 20 features having information gain ratio over the average of the dataset. Then, we trained and tested the proposed system. This gave us a detection rate greater than 93% with an average processing time equals to 3 Â 10 À6 s per example. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 describes very fast decision tree algorithm. Section 4 states the proposed system. Section 5 presents the experiments and results. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Related work
Nowadays, authors have designed numerous IDSs to detect computer and network intrusions. Several data mining techniques have been used to make networks' intrusions detectable. The first class of approaches uses decision trees (DT) to build attack model. Several variations of decision trees were used such as partial decision tree [3] , C4.5 [4] , random forest [5] , ID3 decision tree [6] , and J48 [7] . These decision trees models vary in the splitter measure (i.e. information gain, gain ratio, gini index), pruning technique, branching types, dataset types, etc. The common objective of these decision trees is to iteratively partition the given dataset into subsets where all elements in each final subset belong to the same class. These models have been built from network packets to detect network intrusions with high precision. The main issue with these methods is that they cannot be adaptive with distribution variation in network packets while the proposed system solved this problem by selecting algorithm which works with concept drift.
Another class of these approaches has used evolutionary computation [8] . Self-Organizing Map [7] and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) [7] were trained to recognize normal from abnormal traffic. In addition, genetic programming [9] is achieved very high detection ratio combined with slow model. However, these techniques have performance issues and cannot work in online mode. One of the main goals of this paper is to enhance IDS performance.
Different class of efficient data mining approaches is used to differentiate malicious traffic from normal ones. Bayes network classifier by Staniford et al. [10] is used to calculate the conditional probabilities of several connection features with respect to other connection features. The anomalous connection is determined using these probabilities. SVM is used by Eskin et al. [11] , and Honig et al. [12] in addition to their clustering methods for unsupervised learning. The achieved performance was as good as or better than both of their clustering methods. In addition, Fuzzy logic rules by Luo [13] attempted to classify network data. The author verified that the combination of fuzzy logic with association rules and frequency episodes generates more abstract and flexible patterns for anomaly detection. The author approach utilizes fuzzy association rules and fuzzy frequency episodes to extract patterns for temporal statistical measurements at a higher level than the data level.
An additional class of approaches proposed Multilevel IDSs to achieve highest attack detection rate. Multi-level IDS designed by Chen et al. [14] is composed of IDS, firewall, and a report system in order to present a unified report format to the end user. This multi-level IDS supports specific types of these + MODEL integrated systems. This system focuses on reporting technique which is different from ours. The most related work to ours is the multi-level IDS (ML-IDS) by Al-Nashif [15] that uses autonomic computing to automate the control and management of ML-IDS. Three levels of granularities are used by ML-IDS which are traffic flow, packet header, and payload. Then it employs a fusion decision algorithm to improve the overall detection rate and minimize the occurrence of false alarms. Genetic algorithm, neural network, least square and other approaches have been used in multiple-level decision fusion, which are different from the used technique in the proposed system. In addition, the proposed system focuses on designing lightweight IDS while ML-IDS goal is to be autonomic.
Very fast decision tree algorithm
VFDT is a high-performance data mining system based on Hoeffding trees. Many of classification learning methods have been proposed, of which the decision tree learning method is commonly used. This is because it is fast and the description of classifiers that it derives is easily understood. One of the data stream algorithms that support the decision tree learning method is the VFDT. As data arrives, this data stream grows gradually while the data is classified [16] . VFDT allows the use of either information gain or the Gini index as the attribute evaluation measure. It includes a number of refinements to the algorithm [2] . The pseudo code of VFDT is revealed in Fig. 2 . The VFDT does not accumulate the examples in main memory. The reason for that is it can gradually grow without waiting for the arrival of all the examples. The construction algorithm of the VFDT accumulates only the classes of examples and the contemporaneous occurrence frequency of attribute values in each node to decrease the consumption of memory and processing time, instead of accumulating examples in a decision tree [2] .
The VFDT gradually grows as examples are received to create leaf nodes that grow into branches from only the root node. When it creates new nodes, it grows the decision tree, accumulating frequency information in the previous node and measuring whether the new nodes fulfill the statistical criteria [16] .
VFDT is different from classical decision trees algorithms. Classical decision tree receives all examples as input and is working in an offline mode. Therefore, it cannot be applied to data streams. On the other hand, a VFDT construction in which new examples arrive in sequence at short intervals in a data stream and huge number of accumulated examples is called an online type decision tree [16] .
Very fast decision tree can optionally decide that there is effectively a tie and split on the current best attribute if DG < ε < t, where t is a user-specified threshold. The most significant part of the time cost per example is re-computing G. It is inefficient to recomputed G for every new example, because it is unlikely that the decision to split will be made at that specific point. Thus, VFDT allows the user to specify a minimum number of new examples n min that must be accumulated at a leaf before G is recomputed. This effectively reduces the global time spent on G computations by a factor of n min , and can make learning with VFDT nearly as fast as simply classifying the training examples. Memory usage is also minimized by dropping early on attributes that do not look promising. As soon as the difference between an attribute's G and the best one's becomes greater than ε, the attribute can be dropped from consideration, and the memory used to store the corresponding counts can be freed. VFDT can rescan previously-seen examples. This option can be activated if either the data arrives slowly enough that there is time for it, or if the dataset is finite and small enough that it is feasible to scan it multiple times. This means that VFDT needs never grow a smaller (and potentially less accurate) tree than other algorithms. This is because of using each example only once [2] . A simple comparison between DT and VFDT is based in Table 1 .
The proposed system
The proposed system is dedicated to detect intrusions on a network by using anomaly intrusion detection approach. This approach is used to detect the known and novel attacks in traffic network. The proposed system operates in two grains levels. The first one works with basic features while the second mode works with statistical features of captured packets. Definition 1 states these features; more description on these features can be found in Ref. [17] . Definition 2 states the two grains levels IDS. Definition 1. The basic features set BF is a five tuples set such that BF ¼ <source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port, protocol>. The statistical features set SF is a 20 tuples set such that SF¼<duration, protocol_type, service, flag, src_bytes, dst_bytes, logged_in, count, srv_count, serror_rate, srv_serror_rate, rerror_rate, srv_rerror_rate, same_srv_rate, dst_host_-count, dst_host_srv_count, dst_host_same_srv_rate, dst_host_serror_rate, dst_host_srv_serror_rate, dst_host_srv_rerror_rate>. BF can be directly extracted from any packet while SF represents a connection and requires a set of packets to be created.
Definition 2.
A fine-grained IDS is the system working on SF set of features. Coarse-grained IDS is the system working on BF set of features.
The proposed system is composed of two grains levels IDS that allows the system to analyze network traffic on different granularities. The two levels IDS is different from available IDSs in which it adapts with network situation when it is under attack or not. Its detection levels are Coarse-grained IDS and finegrained IDS. In normal case, where intrusions are not VFDT algorithm is selected as classifier to achieve this goal because it is capable of processing and analyzing of high-speed network traffic, and detecting the intrusion in real time. The pseudo code of the proposed system is presented in Fig. 3 . The switching between two grains levels of IDS can be noted in Fig. 3 . Lines (5e10) represent the coarsegrained IDS where five standard features will be inspected. The more packets' features inspected are the more accuracy we will get. For this reason, the finegrained IDS (Lines 13e18) is proposed to inspect more information about packets. The extracted features are organized as connection records to feed them to the model directly in order to determine the nature of connection as soon as possible to give the appropriate response. The fine-grained IDS gives more accurate results than coarse-grained IDS but at the expense of response time, since it waits enough number of packets to calculate the connection record.
The proposed system consists of four processing stages, which are data collection, pre-processing, classification, and response. Both IDS levels require adequate connection information to train the proposed model. Therefore, the system is doing update the information at any time to obtain a sufficient number of connections which enable building a decision tree for attacks. After connection/packet information is available, a VFDT algorithm is applied in one of the IDS levels in order to do a classification and make the decision (either normal or attack). In case of an attack is detected, a report is generated providing information of the attacks, e.g. IP addresses, time … etc.
The main task of the two grains level IDS is to identify intrusion patterns by considering the features that are extracted from packets. The VFDT detector constructs a decision tree by using constant memory and constant time per sample. The tree is built by recursively replacing leaves with decision nodes. Sufficient statistics of attribute values are stored in each leaf. Heuristic evaluation function is used to determine split attributes converting from leaves to nodes. Nodes contain the split attributes and leaves contain only the class labels. The leaf represents a class that the sample labels. When a sample enters, it traverses the tree from root to leaf, evaluating the relevant attribute at every single node. After the sample reaches a leaf the existing statistics are updated. At this time, the system evaluates each possible condition based on attribute values: if the statistics are sufficient to support the one test over the other, a leaf is converted to a decision node. The decision node contains the number of possible values for the chosen attribute of the installed split test. A decision tree to classify the attacks may become large. However, the error rate is high because it becomes very complicated tree. Therefore, decision tree is pruned to minimize error rate and becomes more simply and easily understandable.
The experimental results
In this section, we describe the experiments conducted to evaluate our system. The proposed system was tested on a P4 Core (TM) i3CPU processor 2.13GHzwith 2.00 GBRAM running Linux Fedora. Two different datasets were used in our experiments: a real dataset, and KDD CUP 99 dataset [17] . The real dataset was collected from a network consisted of three hosts for a week and a rate of 10 h a day. The results with real dataset are not included in this paper for space purposes. In the following subsections, we consider KDD CUP 99 dataset in a level of details, preprocessing stage, the performance metrics, and the main results we got. 
KDD CUP 99 dataset description
Since 1999, KDD CUP 99 [17] has been the most widely used dataset for the evaluation of anomaly detection methods. Furthermore, it contains labeled connections thus facilitates the process of training and testing the model, which encouraged us to use it. It contains about 5 million connection records, each with about 100 bytes. The two weeks of testing data have around two million connection records. KDD CUP 99 training dataset consists of 4,898,430 single connection vectors each of which contains 41 features. These connections are labeled as either normal or an attack, with exactly one specific attack type [18] . KDD CUP 99 is actually composed of three datasets: Whole KDD which contains about four million registers, 10% KDD dataset, and Corrected KDD for testing purposes. More description about the dataset is stated in Table 2 .
The simulated attacks fall in one of the four categories [19] . These categories are Denial of Service Attack (DoS), Probing Attack, User to Root Attack (U2R), and Remote to Local Attack (R2L). It is important to note that the test data is not from the same probability distribution as the training data, and it includes specific attack types which are not appeared in the training data which make the task more realistic. The datasets contain a total number of (22) training attack types, with an additional (16) types in the test data.
The dataset has 41 attributes for each connection record plus one class label. Features are grouped into four categories [19] . Firstly, basic features which can be derived from packet headers without inspecting the payload. Secondly, content features in which the domain knowledge is used to assess the payload of the original TCP packets. Thirdly, time-based traffic features are designed to capture properties that mature over a 2 s temporal window (Statistical). Finally, hostbased traffic features utilize a historical window estimated over the number of connections.
Preprocessing
Different preprocessing techniques have been applied on KDD CUP 99 dataset one of which is features selection. Irrelevant and redundant features decrease not only the detection speed but also detection accuracy possibly. The information gain (IG) measure had been used to rank these feature. Fig. 4 shows the classification of the (41) Another pre-processing has been done by converting each feature from text or symbolic into numerical form. In this conversion, an integer code is assigned for each symbol. For instance, in the case of protocol type feature, 0 is assigned for TCP, 1 for UDP, and 2 for the ICMP symbol. Attack names were first mapped to one of the twenty-three classes, 0 for Normal, until 22for the warezmaster attack.
Performance metrics
For ranking the different results, there are standard metrics that have been used in order to evaluate network intrusion detections. Detection Rate (DR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR) are the most two famous metrics that have already been used. Detection rate metric is computed as the ratio between the number of correctly detected attacks and the total number of attacks as in Equation (1). FAR metric is computed as the ratio between the number of normal connections that are incorrectly misclassified as attacks and the total number of normal connections; see Equation (2) 
Results
The application of VFDT algorithm is not only for distinguishing attacks from normal behaviors, but also identifies different types of intrusions. During training phase, the VFDT constructs a model from selected feature of offline KDD CUP 99. The VFDT was trained on normal and attack traffic in order to classify network traffic according to the range of values in each features connection at the data link, network and transport layers. The file kdd cup.data.gz that contains the full dataset is used for training model.
The corrected.gz file from KDD CUP 99 dataset is used for testing the model. It contains data with corrected labels to evaluate the VFDT model. This data contains more types of attacks than the KDD CUP 99 training set (i.e. 16 new attacks out of 38 possible attacks). Thus, the VFDT can be tested with new types of attacks, which means that the VFDT can be tested as the anomaly detection method. Table 3 shows numbers and percentage training and testing vectors used in the proposed model. From this table, we can note that some attacks are rare with respect to others. This adds a challenge to the proposed system. Table 4 presents the confusion matrix (CM) related to the standard metric for the proposed system. The number of successful predictions as normal examples was (41,951) of the total (42,187), while the model failed in detecting (1631) examples. Furthermore, the number of successful predication for attack examples was (23, 870 ) from the total (25,501), while false alarm was (236) examples.
As a classifier for five classes, VFDT algorithm produced the results shown in Table 5 . Then, the cost per training example for this CM computation was (0.1179). In this Table, the detection rate for U2R and R2L was zero. This is because the used number of connections to train the model on these attacks was very small compared with the rest of the other types of attacks. This case, detection of rare classes, is a challenge for most existing classifiers. In addition, VFDT has good detection for normal, DoS, and Probe attacks, because number of connections that have been used for the training on these classes was appropriate to identify classified.
Accuracy is the main comparison measure for the classifiers. VFDT has competitive accuracy performance when compared with other classification algorithms, where the classification accuracy was (93.825%). The ROC curve of our system is shown in Fig. 6 , our goal is thus to detect as many attacks as possible while minimizing the generation of false alarms. Fig. 6 shows that our system was able to detect most of the attacks for the KDD CUP 99 data at FAR about (0.608%). Table 6 presents the CM for all classes (normal and different types of attack) when using VFDT algorithm as a classifier. From this table, the normal class has the best detection rate compared with other classes, decreasing the FAR of the model. Furthermore, some classes (attacks) have low detection rate such as (spy, perl, rootkit, ftp_write, phf, multihop, warezclient, and warezmaster), due to the following two reasons. Firstly, the small percentage of these classes in the training is noticed. Secondly, the similarity is high between the connections of these classes with normal class. Table 7 presents the CM for new attacks; the total number of new connections was (3619). Most of these connections were DoS and Probe connections. The majority of testing data was Probe connections making the VFDT classifier a little bit biased toward the major class. Because of the distribution of the testing data is different from the training data, this makes it difficult to classify. The DoS attack technique in the testing data is different from the one used in the testing data making a low detection rate. Detection rate for DoS Attacks (back, smurf, and neptune attacks) has more than (90%), however other DoS attacks has lower DR, as we can see in Table 6 .
Most of the KDD CUP 99 dataset contain the packets that used TCP protocol and the least of those that use ICMP and UDP protocol, this explains the reason when high rate is seen in detecting some attacks such as (smurf, Neptune, back, ..etc.) due to they use TCP protocol, while few percentage in detecting some of the attacks such as (pod, land, teardrop ..etc.) due to it used packets UDP and ICMP protocols. Table 7 presents the new kinds of DoS attacks such as (mailbomb, process table, UDP storm, and Apache2 attacks) which are rarely detected because the patterns of the encoded data are very different from the patterns of the old DoS attacks.
Detection rate for Probe Attacks, both old (Satan, Port_sweep, Nmap) and new kinds of attacks (Saint, Mscan) are detected with relatively high detection rate. The data size of the probe attacks are bigger than the attacks included in the other attack classes, so that the patterns of probe attack class are more various than the others. This means that numerous patterns of data can be provided as the learning dataset. This is the reason why probe attacks can be detected with the high detection rate.
Execution time and memory consumption are good comparison measures between classifiers. During the training phase of VFDT algorithm on 100,000 connections, the execution time was (4.09 s), whereas the execution time on 1,000,000 connections was (38.97 s) additional to (0.71 s) prune time, outperforming all classifiers. According to memory consumption, the VFDT takes one third of memory consumed by traditional C4.5 algorithm [4] and half of BayseNet algorithm [7] . The memory allocation for all instances (1,000,000 connections) was (6.72 M), and number of nodes was (112). These properties of VFDT qualifies it to easily work on fast networks.
A comparison of the proposed system with other published systems was conducted as can be seen in Table 8 . Three comparison factors are used here which are dataset size, detection rate, and average training time per example. In this table, we have included the size of the training data and testing data to show how much the results are statistically reliable. The systems in Table 8 have descending order with respect to average training time per example. The fastest system in training is our proposed system as can be seen in the table. While other systems got better detection rate like Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines, Genetic Programming, Naïve Bayes; however, these systems are very slow and not suitable for stream data.
Conclusions
Two levels IDS is proposed allowing the system to analyze network traffic on different granularities. It is different from the available IDSs in which it adapts with network situation when it is under attack or not. Its detection levels are coarse-grained IDS and finegrained IDS. These two detection levels are tested with DARPA 1999 dataset achieving detection rate higher than (93%), outperforming most classifiers. VFDT has proved its efficiency in both generalization tree and new attacks detection. Model building and testing using a VFDT algorithm did not exceed 40 s compared with other systems which exceeded hours in building their models. The detection rate of the VFDT classifier depends on sufficient training data and the right features' set. The most significant features for the two classes Normal and R2L heavily overlap which limit the detection rate of R2L attacks. 
